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Abstract
We model the role of reference groups as a mechanism for inequality persistence
across generations. Reference group theory suggests that culturally shaped processes
alter individuals' ambition. As a result, relative deprivation eects may discourage
(encourage) low-background individuals from making adequate mobility-enhancing
investments. The model conrms that reference groups could be an inequality trans-
mission mechanism across generations, and shows that both the size and direction
of this eect depends on, (a) the composition of the reference group, (b) the inten-
sity and functional form of income comparisons, (c) the ex-ante inequality between
agents from dierent social origins and the reward of eort, and (d) the information
about their peers and past income mobility. Our model is more general than previ-
ous models and its ndings are in stark contrast to models based upon self-fullling
beliefs and fatalistic predictions. Finally, our model explicitly links two strands of
the literature: Reference group theory and aspiration failure models.
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1 Introduction
Reference group theory (Boudon, 1974) suggests that culturally shaped processes may
aect economic expectations, ambition or taste for economic success of individuals. As
a result, social origin and reference groups may shape individual's mobility expectations,
economic aspirations or taste for eort, thus becoming a mechanism for the transmission
of economic advantage across generations (Piketty, 2000).
Recent evidence for the US, for instance, shows that the environment of places matters
for intergenerational mobility (Chetty and Hendren, 2018a). Exposure to favourable
socioeconomic characteristics of places, such as low concentration of poverty, reduced
inequality and criminality, and better schools, produce better outcomes for children in
poor families (Chetty and Hendren, 2018b). In moving to better places, individuals are
exposed to better environments which change individuals' reference group. Of course, the
environment of neighbourghoods is but one of the many factors that explain how reference
groups are chosen.
This paper explores how individuals' economic opportunities are shaped by reference
groups. In its simplest form, the idea is that poor individuals who only know and mingle
with people of their same condition, see their ambition, taste for eort, or information
about feasible opportunities constrained by their social environment. However, similarly
poor individuals who are (also) exposed to higher income individuals with better life
conditions and dierent social norms can decide whether to increase their eort and catch
up with them or not to and give up the possibility to climb up the social ladder, possibly
because inequality seems irreversible to them or because they prefer avoiding frustration.
Introduce a quote from Poverty Safari here.
Our approach incorporates the idea that agents' objective function considers the self-
perceived valuation of their relative position in their reference group.1 The composition of
reference groups denes a reference income level, and agents care about the gap between
their income and their reference income. We model rational agents from two dierent
social origins who choose the level of eort that maximizes their expected utility, assuming
that they know the relative importance of eort and of predetermined factors for the
achievement of economic success. We do this exercise under two dierent assumptions
about the utility function. On the one hand, we assume diminishing marginal utility
from standard neoclassical theory. On the other, we follow the tenets of prospect theory
and assume loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.2 This way we accommodate recent
1Empirical evidence suggests the relevance of relative concern regarding human motivations (Frank,
2005), worker's eort decisions (Huet-Vaughn, 2015), and economic satisfaction (Card et al., 2012).
2Loss aversion refers to the tendency of people to give more importance to losses relative to a reference
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developments in behavioural economics that show how pervasive and fundamental is
the role of changes [...] in assessing the behavior and welfare of individuals (Rabin,
2002). To gain a rst insight, we rst consider a simple scenario where individuals know
the composition of their reference group and also have perfect information about their
reference group income (forward-looking agents). In a second exercise, we assume that
agents have imperfect information about the expected eort of their reference group and
base their choices on a priori beliefs about the probability of economic success of dierent
social origins. Beliefs are updated according to Bayes' rule, implying that past mobility
aects the expected income of the current generation. This framework allows us to derive
long term eort equilibrium levels and to examine the eect of relative concern on the
dynamics of intergenerational mobility.
Our results characterize the situations where relative concerns induce individuals to put
in more eort, and thus where upward mobility is more likely. When agents are assumed
forward-looking (i.e. expected eort is known), two elements govern eort decisions: the
(dis)utility of eort and the gains in utility of lower relative deprivation. Two factors
determine the latter, the parameters that determine the probability of economic success,
such as returns to eort and ability or ex-ante inequality, and individuals' response to
the economic outcomes, i.e. the shape of their utility function. When eort is seen as
a cost, individuals will put in more eort whenever this cost is outweighed by the gains
from lower deprivation. When agents derive utility from eort, eort always pays.
When expected eort is unknown and eort beliefs are based on the mobility of the pre-
vious generation, the results that emerge from our model conrm that reference groups
aect inequality of economic success between individuals from dierent social origins, be-
cause of the relative income eect and aspirations conformation. The assumed functional
form of relative concern, the composition of reference groups and past mobility trajecto-
ries for agents from dierent social origins easily generate multiple equilibrium in eort
levels. That is, eort levels of agents with identical ability dier in the long term, which
aect long-term income mobility, and also persistent inequality. Our results suggest that
the size and direction of the relative income eect depend on four key issues: (a) the
composition of the reference group, which is relevant regardless of inheritance patterns
between generations; (b) assumptions about the functional form of relative concern; in-
come mobility is very dierent when the functional form of relative concern accords with
standard assumptions or prospect theory assumptions; (c) ex-ante inequality and relative
eort rewards; (d) expected eort beliefs and past mobility perceptions.
As in previous models where comparisons matter for individual utility (Clark and Os-
wald, 1998; Piketty, 1998; Frank, 1997; 2005), our model yields a suboptimal equilibrium
because agents ignore the externalities of their eort decisions. We identify two sources of
point than to gains. Diminishing sensitivity is the tendency of people to put less weight on marginal
changes for changes that are further away from the reference point.
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externalities. A rst one happens between individuals from dierent social origin, as the
eort of higher origin agents generates a negative externality on the decisions of agents
from lower origin, the ineciency being larger the higher the inequality between agents
from dierent social backgrounds. The second source of externality comes from within
agents of the same lower origin.
Our model helps understand recent stylized facts in the literature regarding inequality and
mobility, such as the so-called Great Gatsby curve, which shows the positive relationship
between income inequality and intergenerational mobility (Solon, 2002; Krueger, 2012;
Corak, 2013; Mitnik et al., 2015; Chetty et al., 2014). It also allows to interpret the
evidence about heterogeneous aspirations and adaptive preferences hypothesis (Festinger,
1975; Sen 1985a; 1985b; Elster, 1985; Clark, 2009). Furthermore, it also helps explain
situations of low mobility for certain social groups and contributes to explain why agents
with a similar family background and abilities have dierent economic success.
We contribute to the theoretical literature on the socio-cultural mechanisms of inequality
persistence, in particular to the literature that models the inuence of reference groups
(Postlewaite, 1998; Weiss and Ferschtman 1998; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005). We
build on Piketty (1998), that models how public beliefs about one's ability (social status)
and self-fullling beliefs may lead to persistent inequality. Piketty views his theory of
persistent inequality through the status motive as very similar to Bourdieu's sociological
theory, which suggests that the way the dominant discourse in capitalist societies discour-
ages lower-class individuals from seeking to socially progress and encourages instead to
settle for less prestigious social outcomes is largely responsible for persistent inequality
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964 and 1970). Piketty also relates his theory with the refer-
ence group theory (Boudon, 1974). However, unlike our model, Piketty's model does not
accommodate two important features that derive from reference group theory, namely,
people care about their relative position with respect to a reference point, and people
react dierently depending on the composition of their reference group. Furthermore, as
in Piketty (1998) we rst assume forward-looking agents, but unlike Piketty (1998) we
also consider the situation where agents do not know the eort of their peers and update
their eort beliefs by a backward-looking learning process. Finally, even though we also
model two social origins, we allow individuals from the same social origin to have dierent
eort equilibrium levels depending on their reference group, introducing thus heterogene-
ity within social class. The introduction of these four features in our model allows us to
examine the conditions under which, and the way, reference groups aect income mobility
in a way that is not possible in Piketty's model. Our model is more general than previous
models and its ndings are in stark contrast to models based upon self-fullling beliefs
and fatalistic predictions, when relative income and leisure are assumed complements.
Our paper speaks to the recent literature on aspirations (Appadurai, 2004; Ray, 2006;
Genicot and Ray, 2017). First, if we assume that income aspiration is the income of the
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reference group, our paper provides a framework to discuss the conditions that lead to
the two types of aspiration failure identied by Ray (2006) when agents from low social
origin do not include agents from high social origin in their aspiration window, and when
previous inequality and the relative costs of eort are so high that agents perceive the
goal to be unattainable and are thus discouraged. Our paper diers from Dalton et al.
(2016) in that we focus on the external or social conditions whereas they study how a
behavioural bias (an internal constraint) inuences the formation of aspirations dierently
for poor and non-poor individuals.
This complementarity also provides new arguments to the policy discussion. Piketty
(2000) argues that sociocultural inequalities could generate extra inequality persistence,
where intergenerational mobility would be ineciently low. In this context, appropriate
corrective policies (or alternative wealth distribution) could raise intergenerational mo-
bility and output at the same time. However, Piketty's conclusions are ambiguous when
persistence is explained by reference group theory. We show that when relative income
and leisure are complements reference groups always promote higher eort levels and lead
to both higher mobility and output. Ray (2006) argues that it is perfectly possible for
an unequal society to create local attainable incentives among the poorest individuals.
Armative action and public education may be policy tools that could be used to cre-
ate higher local connectedness and to aect aspiration conformity. We show under what
conditions these policies may also contribute to improving mobility when relative groups
matter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief outline
on how relative concern has been modelled in economics. The third section focuses on
the role of income comparisons and their implications in terms of eort decision and
income mobility when we assume forward-looking agents. The fourth section considers
backward-looking agents under imperfect information and introduces an updating beliefs
rule to describe the long-term eort equilibrium. Finally we conclude.
2 Relative concern in economics
In this paper we dene status as relative concern. Postlewaite (1998) and Frank (2005)
suggest that evolutionary theory provides a strong argument for an innate concern for
relative standing. Agent's relative concern is explained by competition for relative posi-
tion in their evolutionary past. Hopkins (2008) distinguishes three dierent evolutionary
explanations. The rivalry story (the success of others agents reduces own opportunity),
the information story (the experiences and success of other agents is useful information
about potentially protable activities) and the perception story (because preferences
are incomplete, relative comparison is a fundamental psychological mechanism to evalu-
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ate goods).3
Sociologists have a long standing interest in the concept of social status to study social
interactions (Weber, 1922). However, this concept has received somewhat less attention in
economics.4 One central issue is whether status is a direct argument of the utility function
or its relevance is only instrumental. In this paper we assume that status has intrinsic
value and we focus on relative income with respect a reference group.5 According to the
second interpretation, status is relevant because it indirectly aects their opportunities
and could be interpreted as an investment decision. In this case, status could be analyzed
within the traditional economic paradigm, which assumes agents optimizing with stable
preferences (Postlewaite, 1998).
Reference groups are endogenous, and they are likely to depend on several factors. Falk
and Knell (2004) argue that individuals choose the reference group to balance self-improvement
and self-enhancement motives, while Clark and Senik (2010) suggest that reference groups
depend on the type of regular social interactions of individuals. The empirical literature
regarding the selection process of the reference group is inconclusive. We will abstract
from these aspects and assume that the composition of the reference group is exogenous.
We model relative concern by making assumptions about the eect of the income gap
yR between own y and reference group income yRG, yR = y − yRG, on own utility.6
Previous studies typically follow the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory that
suggest utility to increase with yR, i.e. ∂U(·)
∂yR




< 0 ) when yRG < y. However, there is less agreement on the sign of
the second derivative with respect to relative income for agents with relative deprivation
(yRG > y). Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) argue that the objective function could be convex
or concave in relative income, for those agents. The standard assumption of diminishing
marginal utility of income in neoclassical theory implies a concave objective function in
relative income, while prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), leads to a concave
3An alternative explanation would be that relative concern arises from current social arrangements.
The nature of economic competition of institutions induces individuals to make relative comparisons
(Hopkins, 2008).
4See Heetz and Frank (2011) for a review of the literature.
5Rank of the individual in the outcome distribution of the reference group is also used to model relative
concern or status (Layard, 1980; Robson, 1992; Clark et al., 2009a; 2009b).
6See Hopkins (2008) for a review of models of relative income concern. Since we study reference groups,
we model relative concern relative to a reference point. Alternative modelling strategies use inequality
aversion to model relative concern. For instance, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) use non-self-centered
inequality aversion, which results from the externalities that inequality generates or from agent's views
about fairness. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), however, assume self-centered inequality aversion where agents
dislike others having more (envy) but where low income for others reduces own utility (compassion).
7Alternative options have been proposed, mainly for incomes above the reference group income, i.e.
yR > 0. Duesenberry (1949) argues that poorer individuals are negatively inuenced by the income
of their richer peers, while the opposite is not true. This implies ∂U(.)/∂yR = 0 if yR > 0, while
∂U(.)/∂yR > 0 if yR < 0. It has also been argued that for compassionate individuals own utility increases
when there is an improvement in the income of those agents below them, which implies ∂U(.)/∂yR < 0
if yR < 0.
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objective function in relative income, reecting diminishing marginal sensitivity to larger
deviations from the reference group income (∂
2U(·)
∂2yR
> 0 ) see Figure 1. In modeling the
agent's objective function below, we will show that mobility implications of reference
groups depend crucially on whether standard or prospect theory assumptions are used.
3 A model of eort choice when reference groups mat-
ter
3.1 Basic assumptions
We assume an economy made up of a continuum of agents I = [0, 1], who can be divided
into two social backgrounds, lower class origin (IL; i.e. whose parents' income level was
y0) and upper class origin (IU , i.e. whose parents' income level was y1). In this economy
the agent's income is a random variable and there are two possible income levels, y0 and
y1 (0 < y0 < y1 and ∆y = y1 − y0). The probability that agent i obtains a high income
level depends positively on her ability (B ≥ β > 0), her eort (ei ∈ (0, Ē)) and luck
(π, with π ∈ (0, 1]).8 Furthermore this probability is conditioned by social origin and it
is given by,
Pr(yi = y1|IL) = π + θβei
Pr(yi = y1|IU) = π + ∆π + θβei
(1)
where Pr(.) denes the probability of the event in brackets occurring, ∆π captures previ-
ous inequality between agents from dierent social backgrounds, and θ > 0 is the same for
all agents and measures the extent to which higher eort and higher ability translate into
higher probability of high income.9 Because they receive inheritance (∆π>0) from pre-
vious generations, for the same eort (and ability) the expected probability of economic
success is higher for agents from origin IU than for those from origins IL.
Furthermore, we assume π + ∆π + θBĒ < 1 .10
3.2 Agents' objective function
To discuss how optimal eort decisions are aected by income comparisons, we include
an additional argument in the standard individual utility function: the self-perceived
8There is an exogenous maximum eort level Ē > (1 − α)cθβM∆y. This allows us avoid corner
solutions in probabilities. Furthermore, without status motives the unique equilibrium eort level will be
lower than Ē.
9∆π explains the inequality of family transmitted human capital and/or inequality of collateral in
case of credit constrains (Piketty, 1998).
10This assumption guarantees that the probability of economic success falls strictly between 0 and 1.
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i , ei) = (1− α)yi + αG(yRi )− C(ei) (2)
where Ui is the utility function for agent i and α ∈ [0, 1]. Agents enjoy own income (yi) for
consumption reasons, and dislike eort ei because they enjoy leisure (agents perceive that
eort is a cost dened by the function C(ei) = e2i /2c, where (1/c) is the marginal cost of
eort and c > 0).11 For simplicity, we rst assume that the utility function is additively
separable, and that the status motive is a direct argument of the utility function due
to its intrinsic value, where 0 < α < 1 measures the extent to which agents care about
it. Agents care about their relative deprivation (RD) which arises from a comparison
between their income and that of their reference group, and they dislike unfavorable
income comparisons.12 The function G(yRi ) = G(y − yRGi ) is an attempt to formalize the
discussion of how reference group income and relative concern aect an agent's utility,
where yRi represents the dierence between own income (yi) and expected reference group
income (yRGi ).
13
Following our discussion in section 2, G(yRi ) is a continuous function dened as,
G(yRi ) =
G(yRi ) = G(yRi ) < 0; GyRi (·) > 0; if yRi < 0G(yRi ) = 0 if yRi ≥ 0 (3)
where GyRi (.) is the rst derivative of G(·) with respect to y
R
i .
As in previous studies, we assume asymmetry in income comparisons.14 This assumption
recognizes that agents are upward looking when making comparisons and that the envy
eect dominates relative comparisons. Agents care about having a small gap between
their income and their reference group income, but relative concern disappears when this
11Since we focus on the incidence of relative income on eort decisions, we assume a linear relationship
between absolute income and utility, for simplicity. Other studies assume non-linear relationships, and
explain the implications for income mobility (Lewis and Ulph, 1998; Antman and McKenzie; 2007; Carter
and Barrett; 2006).
12Since our concern is the individual's income gap, we do not consider non-self-centered inequality
aversion in the objective function.
13We assume a cardinal perspective of relative income concern, a decision based on previous papers.
This assumption is also related with aspiration models. As noted in Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008),
cardinal and ordinal approaches have dierent implications. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that
assumptions about second and third derivatives of G(·) incorporate ordinal concern (Kolm, 1976a; 1976b).
14Other studies have already used this assumption. Stark et al. (2012) used the same assumption to
formalize the link between human capital choices and social location choices. Bowles and Park (2005)
used it to model the Veblen eect. Genicot and Ray (2017) also suggest upward looking aspirations
formation to describe the relationship between social interaction and aspiration formation. Dalton et al.
(2016) use a similar framework to explain aspiration failure. Dusenberry (1949) postulated and tested
the hypothesis that relative income comparisons are asymmetric. Finally, this assumption is empirically
supported by Bowles and Park (2005), Stuzter (2004) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005).
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Figure 1: Relative concern functional form
gap is positive.15
3.3 The reference group income
We consider exogenously dened reference groups. The composition of reference groups
denes a reference income level and agents care about the gap between their own income
and their reference income. The fraction Pi and (1− Pi) of agents from origin IU and IL
respectively form the reference group of agent i. Each agent i knows her Pi, which is a
random variable with distribution function F (Pi) for all Pi : 0 ≤ Pi ≤ 1.16 Agent i from
social origin IL compares only with her peers when Pi = 0, and she only compares with
upper-class agents when Pi = 1. As a result, the expected income of the reference group,
y
RG
, is dened as y
RG
= Pi(E(y|IU)) + (1− Pi)E(y|IL).
As stated above, we further assume that social comparisons are upwards. In our setting
this means that richer agents compare only with their peers. That is, we assume that
Pi = 1 for agents from upper-class origins, which is consistent with previous ndings that
suggest income comparisons not to be downward-looking (e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).17
3.4 Informational assumptions
The following informational assumptions are based on previous papers (Piketty, 1995;
1998; Breen and García-Peñalosa, 2002) and some stylized facts concerning social inter-
15Because we focus on the decision of agents with relative deprivation, to simplify, in this section
we assume that pride and compassion eects are 0 or oset each other. Even though this assumption
simplies the analysis, it is worth noting that this only aects the decision of agents without relative
deprivation. If pride eect dominates, the relative income eect motivates a high eort of agents without
relative deprivation.
16Reference groups may be the result of individual choice (Falk and Knell, 2004) or may be conditioned
by individual circumstances. We adopt the latter and assume that reference groups are related with
identity factors and social norms. This idea is consistent with the assumptions about the aspiration
window suggested by Ray (2006).
17This assumption is not essential. The conclusions of section 3.5, which assumes forward-looking
agents, do not change if we assume that 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 for agents from upper-class origins.
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actions, individual beliefs, and income inequality.
 IA.i . Agents have perfect information about the parameters that determine the
probability of economic success (π, ∆π and θ).
 IA.ii . Ex-ante, agents do not have any information about their ability βi (nor
do they know their relative ability) and they assume the mean βM of the ability
distribution f(βi), with 0 < βi ≤ B.
 IA.iii . Other individuals' eort levels, their ability, and their Pi are not publicly
observable; everybody expects agents from lower-class origin to exert eort 0 ≤
ebL ≤ E and those from upper-class origin to exert eort 0 ≤ ebU ≤ E.
 IA.iv . Finally, we assume that the expected income of agents from upper-class
origin is at least equal to the expected income of agents from lower-class origin:
since inheritance is positive only for upper-class agents (∆π > 0), (π + θβE)y1 +
(1− π − θβE)y0 = Max(E(yi | IL) ≤ E(yi | IU).
Piketty (1998) and Breen and Garcia-Peñalosa used assumption IA.i, while Piketty (1995,
1998) assumed IA.ii. Previous papers assume Pi = 0, while unobservability of eort
(IA.iii) is a standard assumption.
As a result, expected income for lower-class and upper-class origin agents is respectively
dened as follows,
E(yi|IL) = (π + θβMebL)y1 + (1− π − θβMebL)y0
E(yi|IU) = (π + ∆π + θβMebU)y1 + (1− π −∆π − θβMebU)y0
(4)
The expected relative deprivation depends on the expected income of agents with dierent
social origins and on the composition of reference groups. Consider rst the case of agent
i from lower-class origin (IL). The ex-ante expected relative deprivation is dened as,
E(yRi | IL) = E(yi | IL)− E(yRGi ) =
Pi︸︷︷︸
Composition
[(E(y | IL)− E(y | IU)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected income gap
between agents ILand IU
+ E(yi | IL)− E(y | IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected income gap







where E(yi | IL) is the expected income of agent i, given that she is IL, and E(y |
IL) is the expected income for agents from origin IL, which was dened in equation
4. Relative deprivation is composed of three terms: the composition of the reference
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group (Pi), the expected gap between agents from lower- and upper-social origin (E(y |
IL) − E(y | IU)), and the expected gap with respect to peer's income. Observe that
relative deprivation has a random component, Pi, and an inheritable component, the
expected income conditional on the origin. Pi also could be interpreted as the quality of
information about the peer group's income.
For agents from origin IU , the expected relative deprivation is dened as,
E(yRi | IU) = E(yi | IU)− E(y | IU) (5.b)
Finally, assumption (IA.iv) implies that dierences in expected eort between lower-
and upper-class origin individuals never outweigh the eect of previous inequality (∆π).
Regardless of the value of Pi expected relative income is smaller for agents from origin IL
than for agents from origin IU (E(yRi | IL) ≤ E(yRi | IU)). Martin, is this last sentence
correct? The previous version said the opposite
3.5 Agents' eort decisions
We assume that agents live one period, are rational, and maximize their expected utility
conditioned on the parameters of the Economy and their beliefs. For agent i from lower-





i , ei) | IL)
]





s.t. E(yRi | IL) = ξ(ei, ebL, ebU , Pi)
(6)
As a benchmark, we consider that ebL and e
b
U are exogenous and agents know their values
(each agent takes others' eort as given), public beliefs are always shared (Assumption
IA.iii). In this case, the utility-maximizing eort level for a lower-class origin agent
eLeq(Pi) is given by





s.t. yRGi = y0 + Pi(π + ∆π + θβMe
b
U)(∆y) + (1− Pi)(π + θβMebL)(∆y)
(7)















if E(yR | IL) ≥ 0
if E(yR | IL) < 0 & e∗∗Leq < Ē
if E(yR | IL) < 0 & e∗∗Leq ≥ Ē
(8)
For agents from origin IU the utility-maximizing eort level eUeq is given by
eUeq(e
b






















if ebU < e
∗
Ueq
if E>ebU > e
∗
Ueq
if ebU = Ē
(8.b)





eq | IL)− 1c < 0
]
holds because of the
concavity of G(yR) (in accordance with standard assumptions) and of c(e). Hence eLeq(Pi)
and eUeq constitute optimum solutions.
All agents with the same reference group will choose the same optimal eort. Namely,
agents from origin IL (IU ) and the same Pi, will choose the same optimal eort eLeq(Pi)=eeq(Pi),
where index i identies the reference group composition. Eort depends on reference
group composition for agents with relative deprivation, but not for agents with relative
auence. Note then that agents from the same origin may choose dierent eort levels
because the composition of their reference groups dier. This result deviates from Piketty
(1998), where all agents from the same origin arrive to the same long-term eort level.
Finally, agents with relative auence will always exert less eort than those with relative




Leq | IL) > 0 and e∗∗Ueq > e∗Ueq because
αaθβM∆yGyR(y
R
Ueq | IU) > 0).
The eect of reference groups on eort
How do optimal eort levels react to changes in reference group incomes? The partial
derivative of optimal eort levels, derived in equation (8), with respect to yRG provides
the answer. We focus on agents from low social origin and expected relative deprivation





if E(yRi | IL) < 0 and e∗∗Leq < E (9)
Since we start assuming that G(·) is concave (i.e. GyRyR(·) < 0), this expression is always
positive suggesting the complementarity between eort and reference group income. The
derivative is zero when eort reaches its maximum level (e∗∗Leq = E). As a result, richer (or
more demanding) reference groups provide higher eort incentives for lower-class agents.
This eect is larger when agents care a lot about their relative position (high α) and when
they are more sensitive to changes in relative deprivation (i.e. high GyRyR(·)).
When Pi 6= 0 agents from lower-class origins have high economic incentives to increase
the amount of eort. This eect is stronger the higher Pi, ebU and e
b
L. Importantly, higher
expected inequality (higher ∆y and ∆π) also creates incentives to work hard and exert
more eort for people with expected relative deprivation (Alessina and Guliano, 2011).
These incentives, however, disappear when E(yi | IL) ≥ E(yRGi ), as e∗Leq = (1−α)cθβM∆y.
Note that the concavity assumption of G(·) models the encouragement eect, but does
not capture frustration or complacency eects. Several arguments and evidence, however,
challenge the encouragement eect. For instance, it has been argued that increased rel-
ative deprivation may increase the cost to access the resources needed to participate in
social activities (Vendrik and Vendrik, 2007; Sen 1985b), which may aect the marginal
cost of eort and eort decisions. This idea is consistent with the social psychology lit-
erature on the relevance of social emotions to explain individual behavior. For example,
Kuziemko et al., (2014) suggest that individuals are likely to face little shame when near
the mean, but shame may increase quickly when they move towards the bottom of the
distribution. People may also have dierent views about what originates illegitimate or
unfair inequality, and this is likely to inuence the eect of inequality on eort (Besley,
2017). In our model, higher ∆π represents the larger importance of inheritance in the
income generating process, which could be perceived as an unfair circumstance. Exper-
imental evidence has shown that agents are willing to punish unfair situations, even at
some immediate cost to themselves (Dawes et al., 2007; Henrich et al., 2010; Fehr and
Ho, 2011). As a result, it is debatable that higher ex-ante inequality ∆π always moti-
vates higher eort. Based on these arguments, it is possible to argue that people could
change their perception of the cost of eort and their motivations, because they face the
increasing cost of relative deprivation or because they think that the initial distribution
is unfair.
To accommodate these arguments in our framework, we assume that G(·) is convex (i.e.
GyRyR(·) > 0) when individuals face relative deprivation (E(yR) < 0), as suggested
by prospect theory, which reects diminishing marginal sensitivity to larger deviations
from the reference group income (see section 2).18 This assumption is also supported by
18Note that assuming GyRyR(·) > 0 when E(yR) < 0, G(.) satises three key assumptions of prospect
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Kuziemko et al., (2014), who argue that in the presence of last-place aversion, the utility
of agents in the bottom of the income distribution may be convex with respect to relative









and the optimality condition still holds in a range of values of yR.19 In other words,
more demanding reference groups lead to lower eort. We have arrived at the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. When E(yR) < 0, under additive comparisons and
asymmetry in income comparisons:
(i) The reference income eect increases the optimal level of eort chosen
by an agent with relative deprivation compared to an agent with relative
auence (e∗Leq < e
∗∗
Leq).
(ii) When the utility function is convex in relative income (GyRyR(.) < 0),
higher reference income always leads to additional eort (∂e
∗∗
Leq/∂yRG > 0 with
e∗∗Leq < Ē).
(iii) When the utility function is concave in relative income (GyRyR(.) >
0), higher reference income always leads to lower eort ∂e
∗∗
Leq/∂yRG < 0 with
Ē > e∗∗Leq > e
∗
Leq).
Proof. direct from eq. (9) and the functional form of G(·).
In sum, assumptions about the sign of GyRyR(·) reect the dierence between prospect
and standard theory, and are central in explaining the eect of reference groups, while
allowing us to model both the encouragement eect and the frustration or complacency
eects.
The role of the reference group on income mobility
Next we discuss whether relative concern generates dierences in eort decisions between
agents from dierent social origins. To simplify the discussion we assume GyRyR(.) < 0,
which represents the most optimistic case, since inequality encourages higher eort.
When α = 0 (i.e. with no relative concerns), equations (8) and (8.b) trivially dene
a unique equilibrium where all agents exert the same eort. However, when α 6= 0,
equilibrium eort depends on Pi, ebU and e
b
L.








implies that eort is always perceived as a cost. In other
words, an increase in the marginal utility due to a decrease in relative deprivation is lower than the
increase in the marginal cost due to higher eort.
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There is one extreme case, when ebU = e
b
L = Ē, then eLeq = eUeq = Ē. This result is
consistent with self-fullling beliefs. For agents from either origin, IL or IU , expected
eorts are high and agents choose high eort. Observe that, although eLeq = eUeq, both
scenarios establish that E(yi | IL) < E(yi | IU) and E(yRi | IL) ≤ E(yRi | IU).
Dierences in expected eorts and relative deprivation yields dierent optimal choices.
Let us rst consider ebU < e
b
L. If Pi 6= 0, the eort of agents from origin IL is higher
than the eort of agents from origin IU (eLeq(Pi) > eUeq). In this case, increased relative
deprivation increases the optimal level of eort chosen by an agent from low social origin,





agents from origin IL only compare with their peers, Pi = 0, eort is the same across
agents from dierent social origins.
Alternatively, if ebU > e
b
L, dierences in eort across agents from dierent social ori-
gins depend essentially on Pi. There is a P ∗ such that −P
∗∆π











∗) = E(yR | IU). However, if Pi > P ∗, eLeq(Pi) ≥ eUeq. That is, a more
demanding reference group (higher Pi) leads to higher eort for agents from origin IL.
On the contrary, if Pi is lower than P ∗, agents from origin IL compare mainly with their
peers, and exert lower eort than agents from from origin IU , eLeq(Pi) < eUeq.20
3.6 When relative eort matters
In the previous section, reference groups enter our discussion only through relative income
deprivation. However, reference group theory considers relative deprivation as a social and
psychological experience, in which individuals take the standards of other individuals as a
comparative frame of reference. This denes not only the patterns of expectations, but
also the perception of comparable sacrice and it thus contributes to explaining why at-
titudes dier among individuals (Merton, 1953; Clark and D'Ambrosio, 2014; Heetz and
Frank, 2011). To address this issue we leave aside the additive comparisons assumption
and include a more general function G(yRi , ei), with GyRi ,ei(·) 6= 0, which includes both
relative income and relative eort (with respect to relative deprivation). This function
incorporates the part of the cost of eort that is cultural and endogenous, while C(ei) is
the part of eort that is exogenous to the relative situation.21 As a result, this function
20Observe that when Pi = P
∗, G(yR | IL) = G(yR | IU ), and then eLeq(P ∗, ebL, ebU ) = eUeq. But when
Pi > P
∗(or Pi < P
∗), E(yR | IL) < E(yR | IU ) (or E(yR | IL) > E(yR | IU ) and G(yR | IL) > G(yR | IU )
(or G(yR | IL) < G(yR | IU ).
21Based on the notions of cognitive dissonance, relative deprivation and social comparison, Festinger
(1957) argues that individuals compare their own input-to-output ratio with respect to a reference level.
According to equity theory, if the comparison is perceived as unfair, the individual may be motivated to
change his behavior and restore his cognitive perception of equality (Adams, 1965). Kandel and Lazear
(1992) or Akerlof and Kranton (2005), incorporate the notion of social norms and analyze how it aects
work incentives.
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considers the way in which relative deprivation aects the perception of eort and how
eort aects the sensitivity to relative deprivation.22 This way we capture the idea that
reference groups establish the eort norm, which could aect individual motivation. We
include the function G(yRi , ei) in the agent's objective function and arrive at,
Ui(yi, y
R
i , ei) = (1− α)yi +G(yRi , ei)− C(ei) (10)
Following the standard assumption, we assume that G(yRi , ei) is decreasing and concave
in its rst argument. However, in the second argument the situation is more exible, and
its functional form allows us to model dierent individual responses and include some
convex parts of function G(·).
G(yRi ) =
G(yRi , ei) = G(.) > 0; GyRi (.) > 0; GyRi yRi (.) < 0 if yRi < 0G(yRi ) = 0 if yRi ≥ 0 (11)
If we assume forward-looking agents and consider eq. (10) in the optimization problem
dened in equations (6) and (6.b), we can derive new optimal eort conditions of agents







e∗Leq = (1− α)cθβM∆y
e∗∗Leq = e
∗
Leq + αaθβM∆yGyR(.) + aα [Ge(.)]
eLeq = E
if E(yR | IL) ≥ 0
if E(yR | IL) < 0 & e∗∗Leq < Ē






e∗Ueq = (1− α)cθβM∆y
e∗∗Ueq = e
∗
Ueq + αaθβM∆yGyR(.) + aα [Ge(.)]
eUeq = Ē
if ebU < e
∗
Ueq
if E >ebU > e
∗
Ueq
if ebU = Ē
(12.b)
We assume that the problem has an optimal solution and the following second order
22To make this assumption a little more concrete, consider an example of the function G(yRi , ei),
G(yRi , ei) = g(y
R
i )v(ei), with g(y
R
i ) > 0, g
′(yRi ) > 0, g
′′(yRi ) < 0 and v(ei) > 0. Note that v(e) is
constant and equals 1 in the basic model (section 3.5). By making explicit assumptions about v(ei),
we clarify the exact nature of the tastes required to explain a particular behavior. On the one hand,
when eort increases, the marginal utility of relative deprivation in the reference group will decrease.
Namely v′(ei) > 0 , which implies Ge(.) > 0 . On the other hand, the sensitivity for relative deprivation
might decrease with higher eort, if v′(ei) < 0, which implies Ge(.) < 0. This function also captures how
relative deprivation aects the perception of the cost of eort. For example, perception of the cost of eort
could be lower when relative deprivation is low, because agents believe that reference group income is an
achievable outcome and they are motivated (v′(ei) < 0). Alternatively, given a high relative deprivation,
when eort is very high, agents could perceive that the goal is unattainable, they are discouraged and
perceive that eort is less eective (or more costly, v′(ei) > 0).
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condition always holds,









U) constitute optimum solutions. The FOC re-
mains unchanged for agents with lower reference group income than own income, i.e.
when E(yR | IL) ≥ 0 relative deprivation has no eect on optimal eort level. However,
this condition changes when E(yR | IL) < 0. If we only focus on interior solutions, an









respectively.23 In this case, the sign of Ge(.) characterizes the agent's response to relative
deprivation and to reference group income. We rst examine the impact of relative depri-
vation on eort. To this end, in Proposition 2 we compare optimal eort of individuals
in relative deprivation with individuals in relative auence, who are otherwise identical.
Proposition 2. When E(yR) < 0, under non-additive comparisons and asymmetry in
income comparisons, we have:
Positional self-encouraged agent, when Ge(·) ≥ 0 (Condition I), relative de-
privation increases the optimal level of eort chosen by an agent with relative
deprivation compared to the eort chosen by an identical agent with no relative
deprivation (with e∗∗Leq ≤ Ē).
Positional stimulated agent, when Ge(·) < 0 and −Ge(·) > θβM∆yGyR(·)
(Condition II), relative deprivation increases the optimal level of eort chosen
by an agent with relative deprivation compared to the eort chosen by an
identical agent with no relative deprivation (with e∗∗Leq ≤ Ē).
Positional discouraged agent, when Ge(·) < 0 and Ge(·) < θβM∆yGyR(·) (con-
dition III), relative deprivation decreases the optimal level of eort chosen by
an agent compared to the eort chosen by an identical agent with no relative
deprivation (with e∗∗Leq ≤ Ē).
Proof. direct from equation (12) and the functional form of G(yRi , ei).
When Ge(·) ≥ 0, the equilibrium eort level e∗Leq is always lower than e∗∗Leq. Under
condition I, given the same level of eort, agents with relative deprivation perceive a
lower cost for additional relative eort and, therefore, they exert higher eort. Here,
function Ge(·) can be interpreted as implying that agents get utility from relative eort.
23Note that non-interior solutions are analogous to those discussed in the previous section. eb∗∗L and
eb∗∗U denote equilibrium eort beliefs.
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Not surprisingly, then, this spurs more eort (self-motivated eect).24
When Ge(·) < 0, relative eort is always a cost. Given an expected income gap, relative
deprivation generates lower utility among those agents who have made greater eort. How-
ever, if −Ge(·) < θβM∆yGyR(·) the larger disutility of high relative eort is compensated
by a lower relative income gap. Therefore, the encouragement eect dominates because
there is high opportunity for income mobility (relative eort pays because θβM∆y is
large enough).
However, if −Ge(·) > θβM∆yGyR(·), the disutility of eort is larger than the gain in
utility that results from the reduction in the relative income gap. Eort does not pay,




Positional self-encouraged and stimulated agents increase upward mobility because their
income increases as a result of higher relative eort. In contrast, positional discouraged
agents reduce upward mobility.
We rst examine the impact of relative deprivation on eort. To this end, in Proposition 2
we compare optimal eort of individuals in relative deprivation with individuals in relative
auence, who are otherwise identical.
We next explore what is the eort response to an exogenous change in yRG among agents
with relative deprivation, when relative eort matters. We are now concerned with the
size of the negative income gap rather than with there being a negative income gap which
is what Proposition 2 addresses. By dierentiating the individual's rst order condition






1− αcGee(.)− αc(θβM∆y)2GyRyR(.)− 2αcθβM∆yGyRe(.)
(14)
The expression in the numerator of eq. (14) determines the sign of ∂e∗∗Leq/∂yRG (the denom-
inator is positive due to the second order condition). Since we assumed GyRyR(.) to be
negative, the sign of the numerator depends on the sign of GyRe(·). This sign indicates
whether the inverse of eort (leisure) and relative income are complements (GyRe(·) ≤ 0)
or substitutes (GyRe(·) > 0).25 If they are complements a larger income gap induces
higher eort. If they are not, the sign of ∂e∗∗Leq/∂yRG is ambiguous, and it depends on the
magnitude of θβM∆yGyRyR(·), namely, the sign depends on relative rewards and ex-ante
inequality. We express these ideas more precisely in proposition 3:
24Kandel and Lazear (1992) use a similar argument to explore how peer pressure operates on worker
eort. They suggest that the peer pressure function can be interpreted as implying that workers get
utility from eort.
25These ideas are used in Bowles and Parker (2005) to discuss the importance of the Veblen eect in
the individual's allocation of time between labour and leisure.
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Proposition 3. When E(yR) < 0, under non-additive comparisons and
asymmetry in income comparisons, we have:
Income-gap self-encouraged agent, when GyRe(·) ≤ 0 (Condition IV), higher
reference income leads to additional eort (∂e∗∗Leq/∂yRG > 0 with e∗∗Leq ≤ Ē).
Income-gap stimulated agent, when, GyRe(·) > 0 and −θβM∆yGyRyR(·) >
GyRe(·) (Condition V), higher reference income leads to additional eort (∂e∗∗Leq/∂yRG >
0 with e∗∗Leq ≤ Ē).
Income-gap discouraged agent, when, GyRe(·) > 0 and −θβM∆yGyRyR(·) <
GyRe(·) (Condition VI), higher reference income leads to lower eort (∂e∗∗Leq/∂yRG <
0 with 0 ≤ e∗∗Leq ≤ Ē).
Indierent agents, when GyRe(·) > 0 and θβM∆yGyRyR(·) = −GyRe(·) (Con-
dition VII), individuals do not respond to changes in reference group income
(∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG = 0).
Conditions IV and V establish a positive relation between eort and reference income, but
there is a strong dierence between them. In the former, higher reference group income
decreases the marginal cost of relative eort (relative eort generates utility). As a result,
higher reference group income always increases eort levels through two channels, the
higher marginal utility of relative income and the lower marginal cost of relative eort.
Note that this result is independent of the economic context, namely does not depend on
the magnitude of ∆π, ∆y, θ and βM .
On the contrary, under conditions V, VI, and VII, relative eort represents a cost, in
accordance with standard economic models, but agents' eort responses are ambiguous.
Under condition V, the marginal utility of relative income is large enough as to com-
pensate the larger marginal cost of relative eort. Overall, then, an increase in reference
income spurs additional eort. Condition VI establishes a negative relation between eort
and reference group income (∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG < 0). Now, the marginal utility of relative income
is insucient to compensate the marginal disutility of relative eort, causing a reduction
in eort. Finally, under condition VII the marginal utility of relative income just com-
pensates the larger marginal cost of relative eort, so that individuals do not respond to
changes in reference group income.
Upward mobility increases when more demanding reference groups result in larger eort,
as with income gap self-encouraged and stimulated agents, while it decreases with income-
gap discouraged agents.
When relative eort is a cost (i.e. conditions V, VI, and VII) the parameters of economic
inequality are relevant in explaining agents' eort responses. Larger returns to eort and
ability (θ), expected ability (β), and income premium (4y) increases the likelihood of
of income-gap stimulated agents and reduces the likelihood of income-gap discouraged
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agents. This characterizes a positive relationship between inequality and upward mobil-
ity, which is consistent with the empirical evidence on the so-called Great Gatsby curve
(Krueger, 2012; Corak, 2013).
The eect of eort rewards (θ) and ex-ante inequality (4π) on eort is more nuanced,
as it depends on whether the principle of diminishing transfers holds.26 If it does, the
response of individuals to higher θ is ambiguous. However, this ambiguity disappears
when GyRyRyR(·) ≤ 0. Now, an increase in θ increases expected relative deprivation and
the sensibility of marginal utility to relative deprivation. Both eects go in the same
direction, so eort increases. Now, however, larger ex-ante inequality (4π) can reduce
or eliminate the incentive to increase eort brought about by a larger θ. Appendix A
discusses in more detail the eect of eort rewards and ex-ante inequality on eort and
relative deprivation.
Proposition 3 also shows that reference group composition, P , is relevant in explaining
eort levels. The relationship between eort and P depends on whether leisure and
relative income are complements.27
3.7 Long-term equilibrium with perfect forward-looking agents
The previous discussion describes the individual decision process in the most simple case,
where agents do not internalize ex-ante beliefs when they take eort decisions. Also, the
discussion does not consider the interaction between individual eort decisions and the
expected eort of peers (i.e. ebU and e
b
L are exogenous). However, own eort decision and
their mobility outcomes may aect expected peers' eort. Furthermore, observe that,
since the expected income of agents from IU aects the utility of agents from origin IL,
but the reverse is not true, the former could be interpreted as leaders and the latter as
followers (Clark and Oswald, 1998). In line with this ideas, we study the following kind
of equilibrium:
Denition A long term equilibrium of the economy is a vector of consistent eort deci-
sions and eort beliefs of agents from low and high social origin, such that eLeq(Pi), eUeq,
ebUeq and e
b
Leq solve equations (12) and (12.b), for all i ∈ IL or i ∈ IU and for all t.
To understand the relationship between equilibrium social eort beliefs and individual
eort decisions it is convenient to include some additional assumptions. First, we add the
following informational assumption.
26The Principle of diminishing transfers (i.e. GyRyRyR(·) > 0), requires utility to increase more for
poorer than for richer individuals in front of the same reduction in the relative income gap of both






and −αa∆y(ebL − ebU − ∆π) > 0 (by as-
sumption IA iv).
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 IA.v We assume agents with fully forward-looking behavior, in the sense anticipating
the actions of others when they take eort-decisions (an extreme Cournot-Nash
assumption satised).
Second, we assume that agents' take decisions in two steps. First, using ebU and e
b
L they








RD = 0 if E(yR | IL) ≥ 0




RD = 0 if E(yR | IU) ≥ 0
RD = 1 if E(yR | IU) < 0
(15b) (16)
In a second step, they maximize expected utility, taking the reference group income as
given and choosing their individual optimal level of eort.
Ex-ante agents share the public beliefs about peers' expected income (E(yi | IL) = E(y |
IL) and E(yi | IU) = E(y | IU) ), so that E(yRi | IU) ≥ 0 and E(yRi | IL) ≤ 0. By
considering eqs. (15) and (15.b) in the optimization problem dened in eqs. (6) and
(6.b), we can derive new optimal eort conditions of agents from origin IL and IU .
eLeq(Pi) =

e∗Leq = (1− α)cθβM∆y
e∗∗Leq = e
∗
Leq + αcθβM∆yGyR(.) + cα [Ge(.)]
eLeq = E
if RD = 0
if RD = 1 & e∗∗Leq < Ē
if RD = 1 e∗∗Leq ≥ Ē
(17)
e∗Ueq = (1− α)cθβM∆y (17b)
Because they anticipate the eort of their peers and share social beliefs, agents from
origin IU do not expect to face relative deprivation (RD(ebU | IU) = 0). Therefore, the
equilibrium is eUeq = e∗Ueq = e
b
Ueq for agents from origin IU . Note that this can be
interpreted as a game with a Nash symmetric equilibrium in which all agents from IU
origin use the same strategy and anticipate expected peer's eort.
However, for agents from origin IL, the equilibrium is dened by eLeq(Pi) and ebLeq =
1́
0
F (Pi)eLeq(Pi)dPi. Although agents from origin IL anticipate peer's expected eort, their
expected relative deprivation is aected by the expected eort of agents from IU (leader)
and the heterogeneity of Pi. First, regardless of ebLeq, the predictions are consistent with
the self-fullling beliefs model in the particular case where every agent from lower-class
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background compares herself only with agents of the same origin (Pi = 0 ). Namely when
agents share public beliefs and assume ex-ante that they belong to a reference group
whose members are all IL, they adopt a behavior that validates their reference group
expectations (if Pi = 0 for all agent i ∈ IL then, RD(0, ebU , ebL | IL)=0 and eLeq(0) = eUeq).
When the structure of reference groups is heterogeneous Pi 6= 0, observe thatRD(Pi, ebU , ebL |
IL)=1 and eLeq(Pi) 6= eUeq. Under conditions I and II, agents from lower-class origin al-
ways have incentives to assume strategies to improve their opportunities to achieve a
better life. As a result, eUeq < eLeq(Pi) if Pi 6= 0. Furthermore, conditions IV and V
establish greater incentives. However, under conditions III and VI, eUeq > eLeq(Pi) if
Pi 6= 0. Namely, expected relative deprivation discourages agents from low social origin
and they choose low eort.
Finally, these results assume the two-step decision process, but general predictions for
income mobility do not change if we assume a simple-step process. In this case, agents
do not care about ex-ante relative deprivation and agents directly maximize expected
utility taking the reference group income as given. We focus now on eort decisions of
agents from IL and to simplify this discussion, we incorporate the following additional
informational assumption, which does not change the results.




For agents from origin IU , the equilibrium is eUeq = e∗Ueq = e
b
Ueq. For agents from origin
IL the equilibrium is dened by eLeq(Pi) > (1 − α)θβM∆y if F (Pi) 6= 0 (namely at




F (Pi)eLeq(Pi)dPi > (1 − α)aθβM∆y = ebUeq. As a result, under conditions I or
II (IV or V), reference group income always motives (discourages) higher optimal eort
of agents from low social origins when there is heterogeneity in the composition of their
reference groups. Furthermore, only if Pi = 0∀i ∈ IL , eLeq = (1 − α)aθβM∆y = eUeq,
which conrms self-fullling-belief.28
3.8 Eciency implications
We next explore the properties of an equilibrium where individuals exert
eort as described in Proposition 2 above and take others' choices as given
(i.e. Cournot-Nash equilibrium). Assume a continuum of agents from origin IL, who
dier by the composition of reference group (Pi), with density function F(Pi). That is, we
keep assumption IA.vi (presented in the previous section) and for notational simplicity
we omit subscript i.
28Observe that contrary to results based on two-step process, in this case, expected peers' eort may
encourage eort of agents from origin IL, even if P = 0.
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For agents from upper-class social origins E(yR | IU) ≥ 0, so equilibrium eort level is
exogenous (see section 3.5). Under these conditions, and considering equations (12) and
(12.b), the expected social welfare is given by,




L) = E(U | IU) + w
´
E(U | IL) =














where the number of agents from origin IU is normalized to unity, and w > 0 represents
the number of agents IL for each agent from origin IU . Under perfect information the





F (P )eLeq(P )dP .
For society to be at an optimum,
eUeq opt = c [(1− α)θβM∆y − λ1] (19)
eLeq opt(P ) = c
[

















F (P )(1− P )αθβM∆yGyR(yR(P ), eL(P ))dP
]
(22)
eUeq opt − ebUeq opt = 0 (23)
1̂
0
F (P )eLeq opt(P )dP − ebLeq opt = 0 (24)
where λ1 and λ2 are the multipliers on constrains dened in equations (23) and (24)
respectively. Therefore, if we compare equations (20) and (19) with the previous equations
(8) and (8.b) for private eort choices, the expected equilibrium is not optimal. Due to
the concavity of (18) and to λ1 and λ2 being positive (from eq. (21) and (22)), socially
expected desirable levels of eort are below those which agents make individually. This
is because eort decisions aect the relative deprivation of others and also because of
the well-known `rat-race' eect induced by relative concern. Since agents ignore the
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externalities stemming from their decisions, the equilibrium based on individual decisions
is suboptimal. This result is in accordance with the ndings from economic models where
individual utility depends on relative situations (Clark and Oswald, 1998; Piketty, 1998;
Frank, 1997; 2005).
Unlike previous models, however, ours distinguishes two possible sources of externalities.
On the one hand, eq. (19) shows that the eort of agents from origin IU (leaders) generates
a negative externality on the decisions of agents from origin IL(followers). Furthermore,
this externality between social origins, will be higher the higher ∆π. That is, regardless
of the eort decisions of agents from origin IL, lower ex-ante inequality reduces expected
ineciency.29 On the other hand, there is a within externality, which comes from the
eort decisions of peers from origin IL.
Finally, note that since ineciency results from individuals exerting too much eort, the
presence of positional discouraged agents (whose reaction to relative deprivation is exert-
ing lower eort) will decrease ineciency as well as expected upward income mobility of
agents from lower social origins, IL.
4 A model of eort choice with reference group and
intertemporal learning
The results of the previous section could be interpreted as a benchmark, which considers
a situation in which there is perfect information (expected eort is known, constant and
exogenous) or fully forward-looking agents (IA.v). Now we assume that agents from
origin IL do no know the eort of the peers of their generation and they choose their
eort based on their beliefs (ebL). Each generation updates their beliefs with respect to
the previous generations' beliefs by trial and error methods using local knowledge based on
their peers' past experience. Beliefs are updated by a backward-looking learning process,
that is, in light of the recent experience of peers from the same social origin from a
previous generation. This establishes a connection between expected peers' eort and
performance in terms of the income mobility of a previous generation. Bowles (2004)
argues that the backward-looking learning approach has advantages when compared to
the forward-looking learning process.30 We assume that agents incorporate information
of the economic performance of the previous generation when they update their a priori
29Observe that equilibrium based on individual decisions will be optimum when Pi = 0. But in this
case, eort decisions reduce income mobility. Furthermore, aggregate ineciency will be higher when
more agents from origin IL present high reference income (F (Pi)
′ > 0).
30Bowles (2004) considers backward-looking learning process inside evolutionary game theory. In con-
trast to the forward-looking agents in classical game theory, this approach addresses the history of the
agents.
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public beliefs, which are transmitted from previous generations.31 Finally, as we discuss
in section 4.4, this learning process seems useful to explain the formation of aspirations
based on social interactions (Appadurai, 2004, Genicot and Ray, 2017).
Our model establishes leader-follower dynamics between agents from origin IL and agents
from origin IU . Therefore, in order to analyze the role of the reference group as a deter-
minant of income inequality persistence, we can retain assumption IA.vi used in section
3.7 ( ebU < e
∗
Ueq and it is exogenous) because agents from origin IL can not aect the eort
decision of agents from IU . This implies that the optimal eort of agents from origin IU
is eUeq = (1−α)cθβM∆y, which represents a benchmark for agents from origin IL. In the
remainder of this section, we focus on agents from origin IL (for notational simplicity we
omit the social origin sub-index L and U for the rest of this section).
4.1 The information structure
We remove assumption IA.v and now agents are uncertain about the real eort of their
peers when they choose their eort level. Each agent takes others' eort as given within the
same period, but they update their beliefs about eb between generations. Informational
assumptions IA.i and IA.ii from section 3 remain the same, but we include the following
additional informational assumptions:
 IA.vii . Individual eort levels are not publicly observable, but agents know that
they are between a certain high eort level (e ≤ Ē) and a certain low eort level
(e ≥ 0), with (e ≥ e). Observe that IA.vii substitutes assumption IA.iii.
 IA.viii . The current generation knows the social mobility experienced by the previ-
ous generation, which represents a signal of their eort levels. Namely, they know
x′t which is the real share of successful agents from origin IL from generation t.
 IA.ix . Public beliefs about eort are transmitted across generations, therefore,
generation (t + 1) has a priori information (µapriorit+1 ) based on the real beliefs of
generation t (µt).
 IA.x. Based on the signals x′t, generation (t + 1) updates their a priori beliefs
(µapriorit+1 ) about the eort of their peers.
As agents know π, θ, βM , and ∆y, given eMt they know the distribution of signals (IA.i,
IA.ii, IA.vi, IA.vii, IA.viii IA.ix ), which describes the expected share of successful agents
31Other papers have used this learning procedure and they place an emphasis on the information trans-
mission between generations and the signicance of past trajectories in order to explain heterogeneous
beliefs equilibrium. Piketty (1995) used Bayesian learning to update the belief about the parameters of the
economy, Piketty (1998) used it to explain the public beliefs about status, and Breen and García-Peñalosa
(2002) used it to describe the dierence in preferences across genders.
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from origin IL from generation t, conditional on the state v′t. Taking xt as the real share
of successful agents from origin IL from generation t, agents can derive the probability of
the signal xt = x′t, conditional on the state being v
′
t and their a priori beliefs:
Pr(xt = x
′
t | ν ′t) = Ω(ε′t, ν ′t | ν ′t) = Φ(eMt(ε′t), ν ′t | ν ′t) (25)
where εt and νt are vectors of n dimensions, which respectively reect individual eorts in t
(e1t, e2t.., ent) = εt and n random variables (v1t, v2t.., vnt)=νt, and ε′t and ν
′
t are particular
realizations of both vectors. For notational simplicity, we introduce the function Φ(.),
whose argument is mean eort of agents from origin IL at t, (eMt), which is a linear
function of each element in the vector εt. A detailed description of these derivations and
results is presented in Appendix B.
4.2 Intergenerational learning
Given assumption IA.vi, the expected eort for their peers in generation t is dened as,
ebt = µte+ (1− µt)e (26)
where µt is the public belief of generation t about the participation of high eort agents
among economically successful agents from the previous generation from origin IL. This
parameter is interpreted as the subjective probability attached by the entire generation
that e was the eort of successfully agents from origin IL.
Each generation (t + 1) of agents from origin IL observes a signal x′t from the previous
generation. As a result, they know the real percentage of economically successful agents
from origin IL in the previous period, but they do not observe which one of them made
high or low eort (IA.ii).
According to assumption IA.viii, the current generation have a priori beliefs µapriorit+1 = µt
(Note that eapriorit+1 = e
b
t = µte+(1−µt)e . Since mobility performance is only stochastically




t | ν ′t, µt), agents believe
that there is an error in their apriori beliefs (µapriorit+1 ). As a result, based on the signals x
′
t
generation (t + 1) updates their a priori beliefs about the eort of their peers according
to Bayes' rule.
Observe that the importance of those errors depends on the correlation between eit and
vit. On the one hand, when σ = Corr(eit, vit) > 0 the shock does not redistribute
economically successful agents between low and high eort agents. As a result, eort
pays and high eort agents dominate amongst successful agents. On the other hand,
when σ = Corr(eit, vit) < 0, the shock redistributes agents, that is, some agents with
low eort achieve economic success. Now, although eort has a positive impact on the
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probability of high income, eort rewards are relatively low compared to former case. As a
result, the proportion of low eort agents is relatively high among economically successful
agents, and then ebt (and µt) should be lower. Observe that the sign of this correlation
represents two states of the world.32 The distribution function of signals depends on the
real state of the world. The probability that the public signal x′t is realized conditional












t | σ, ht−1) = Φ(eMt(ε′t), ν ′t | ht−1) (27b)
where ht−1 describes the decisions history of all agents IL from previous generations
(t− 1, t− 2, ...).
As µt = µ
apriori
t+1 is an a priori probability assigned to high eort e, it also represents the
subjective probability of generation (t + 1) that σ is the true state of the world. An
individual from generation (t + 1) uses mobility results (the signals x′t) to update their
inherited a priori beliefs (µt = µ
apriori
t+1 ) about the eort of their peers.
In sum, the sequence of events is as follows:
1. Agents from origin IL from generation t decide how much eort to exert, based on
their beliefs about expected eort of their peers in the current generation (ebt).
2. After the realization of νt, some of them obtain y0 while others obtain y1 (which
generates the public signal x′t).
3. The belief of generation t (µt) is inherited by the next generation (µ
apriori
t+1 = µt).
4. The updated belief of generation (t + 1) (ebt+1) combines that a priori information
with the mobility outcome of generation t. Once mobility of generation t is realized,
the next generation updates their a priori beliefs and they choose their eort level
based on their updated beliefs.
4.3 The long term equilibrium distribution of beliefs
Following Piketty (1995, 1998) and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002), these assumptions
imply that intergenerational learning takes the form of Bayesian updating, with beliefs
being updated by the current generation from the previous generations. Bayesian learn-
ing implies that the outcomes of the previous generation are interpreted in the light of
32Correlation could be interpreted as an expression of the heterogeneous capacity of the agents to
respond to dierent shocks, given their eort.
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the a priori beliefs. As a result, an eort belief (ebt+1) combines a priori information
transmited from previous generations ebt and information about the mobility experienced
by the previous generation x′t. The posterior beliefs of the following generation which











where the a priori belief µapriorit+1 is equal to µt, and the terms Pr(xt = x
′
t | σ̄, ht−1) rep-
resent the conditional probability of the public signals x′t given that ht−1 occurs and that
the true state is σ. These probabilities were dened when we introduced the distribution
function of signals (eqs. (27) and (27b)). Under these informational assumptions, agents
know the functions of the distribution of signals (see Appendix B), so by replacing them









t | ht−1) + (1− µt)Φ(ebt , ν ′t | ht−1)
(28b)
This function describes the evolution of a generations' beliefs over time. Note that this
function depends on a priori beliefs. As a result, when there are heterogeneous a priori
beliefs, the same mobility outcome can give rise to dierent posterior beliefs. If we consider
equations (26) and (28b) together, the eort beliefs are updated according the following
rule,  Φ(ebt , ν ′t | ht−1) > Φ(ebt , ν ′t | ht−1) ⇐⇒ µt+1 > µt ⇐⇒ ebt+1 > ebtΦ(ebt , ν ′t | ht−1) < Φebt , ν ′t | ht−1) ⇐⇒ µt+1 < µt ⇐⇒ ebt+1 < ebt (29)
Whether the updated weight placed on ē is greater than the a priori probability depends
on whether, for the level of eort chosen by the previous generation, the signal observed
is more likely to have occurred for σ̄ than for σ. If a generation t experienced a relatively
high mobility outcome with respect to his a priori beliefs, the conditional probability of
this event given previous history ht−1, is greater for σ̄ than for σ. As such generation t+1
places a higher weight on ē. The opposite holds for the case of low mobility results. The
rationality of the updating belief rule is the following: when agents of generation (t + 1)
have an a priori belief that their peers had made a high eort but were not rewarded
with upward mobility, there will be some downward adjustment of the expected eort for
their current peers.
A general property of this form of Bayesian learning is that the stochastic process µt
describes a martingale, what generation t expects its successors to know next period is
exactly what generation t knows today. Namely, agents' best guess in generation (t+ 1),
as to their posterior belief in any later period is their posterior belief in period t, namely
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E(µt+m | µt, ht) with m > 1 (Aghion et al., 1991; Piketty, 1995; Smith and Sørensen,
2000). As a result, E(ebt+m | µt, ht−1) = E(µbt+m | µt, ht−1)e+(1−E(µbt+m | µt, ht−1))e = ebt .
Assume, without loss of generality, that the true state of the world is σ̄ (namely eort
always pays).33 Therefore µt = 1 is equivalent to allocating full weight to the truth. Pick




which follows a stochastic process {µt}. It describes a martingale conditional on the true
state of the world (σ̄). As a result, standard martingale convergence results can be applied
(Aghion et al., 1991; Piketty, 1995; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Breen and García-Peñalosa,
2000). Piketty (1995) and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2000) derived three propositions
about this process, which could be interpreted in terms of our learning process.
1. The martingale convergence theorem implies that the likelihood ratio, and hence
beliefs, converge in the long term. For any initial beliefs, µ0, in the long term beliefs
converge toward some stationary beliefs, µ∞ with a probability of one. Therefore,
there is a stable solution about the level of expected eort, which is dened as,
eb∞ = µ∞e+ (1− µ∞)e.
2. Given the true state of the world σ̄, the Bayesian updating function dened in eq.
(28) has three xed points. One of them is not stable µ1∞ = 0. There are two stable
long term equilibrium beliefs, one is an interior xed point µ2∞ > 0 and the other
is a corner solution µ3∞ = 1.
3. If initial beliefs are µ0 < µ2∞, then it converges to µ2∞ with a probability of one.
As a result, eb2∞ = µ2∞e+ (1− µ2∞)e. In contrast, if initial beliefs are higher than
µ2∞, then they will be attracted with positive probability Pr(µ, µ2∞) by µ3∞ = 1,
and with positive probability [1− Pr(µ, µ2∞)] by µ2∞.
Observe that both stationary beliefs allocate a positive weight to the true state of the
world. In terms of eort beliefs, eb∞ = e is not a stable solution, while e
b
2∞ = µ2∞e+ (1−
µ2∞)e and eb3∞ = e are stable solutions. Finally, when the interior solution µ2∞ holds,
Φ(ebt(µ2∞), ν
′
t | ht−1) = Φ(ebt(µ2∞), ν ′t | ht−1)⇐⇒ µt+1 = µt ⇐⇒ ebt+1 = ebt . (30)
This expression implies that when agents hold the a priori belief µ2∞, the resulting
expected probability is the same under σ̄ or σ. Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) named
µ2∞ as confounded learning beliefs. At this point nothing can be learned from the
previous generations' signals, and a priori beliefs are equal to the posterior beliefs. They
demonstrated that the probability of converging to the true belief is given by
33Piketty (1995) discusses extensively the reasons that justify such assumption.
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As a result, long term equilibrium beliefs depend on the initial beliefs and the quality
of the public signal information. This result is due to the fact that the same mobility
outcome can give rise to dierent posterior beliefs depending on the probabilities initially
attributed to each situation. Successive learning across generations may be complete, as
a result, generations will access the true value of σ, σ. In this case, an equilibrium belief
about the expected eort of an agent from origin IL is eb3∞ = e. Namely, in this case eort
always pays in the long term, and agents from origin IL expect their peers to exert a
high level of eort. One point worth noting here is that e may not be the true mean
eort of agents from origin IL. This expected level of eort is the most likely value given
that σ is the true state of the world, ht−1 the history of generations from social origins
IL, and µ0 the initial beliefs. In other words, evidence shows that eort pays in terms
of mobility, and that successive learning across generations leads to the highest expected
eort. However, the learning process across generations may be incomplete. In this case
agents perceive that eort rewards are relatively low, even if this is not true. As a result,
agents place a strictly positive weight on the true state of the world (σ), and long term
equilibrium of the expected eort eb2∞ is lower than e, but is higher than e. Although
eort pays and promotes high income mobility, initial beliefs and mobility trajectories
lead, in the long term, to relative lower expected eort for agents from origin IL.
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Equilibrium with intergenerational learning and self-encouraged
agents
In this section we assume that all agents are identical and are self-motivated (Conditions
I and V). Recall that these conditions assume that agents get utility from eort and thus
relative deprivation always motivates high eort. This allows us to explore how eort
decisions are aected by income mobility of previous generations and expected relative
deprivation (results under alternative assumptions are discussed in the next section).
Under imperfect information, social origin establishes a relationship between generations
in two ways. On the one hand, the probability of economic success depends on social
origin (direct channel). On the other hand, there is an indirect channel, because the
experienced mobility of previous generations aects the beliefs about peers' expected
eort. Equation (29) provides a rational updating process, where history is important in
determining equilibrium beliefs and public expected eort. Both channels determine the
incidence of reference groups through their expected relative deprivation.
In the steady state, the Bayesian learning function leads to social beliefs ebL = e
b
L∞. Agents
from origin IL and the same Pi will choose the same optimal eort eL∞(Pi), which is con-
stant, eLeq t−1(Pi) = eLeq t(Pi), ebt−1 = e
b
t . Considering E(y
R
∞ | IL) = ξ(eLeq(P ), ebL∞, ebU , P )
in eq. (8), we arrive at the following expression,
eL∞(Pi) =
{ e∗L∞ = (1− α)aθβM∆y if E(yR∞ | IL) ≥ 0
e∗∗L∞ = e
∗
L∞ − cθβM∆yGyR∞()− cαGe() if E(y
R
∞ | IL) < 0 & e∗∗L∞ < E




As a result, for self-stimulated agents from origin IL the model predicts two possible
scenarios about eort level in the long term. First, when µ0 > µ2∞ agents' beliefs will be
attracted with probability Pr(µ, µ2∞) by ebL∞ = e. Regardless of Pi , agents from origin
IL tend to choose higher eort levels than agents from origin IU , because expected eort of
their peers is high. Expectation of peer's eort will increase, and so will individual eort
in the future. Agents with higher P choose high eort because their relative deprivation
and reference income are relatively high. They are stimulated by the expected income of
agents from origin IU but also by the high eort of their peers from origin IL. Steady-state
eort will always be equal or larger for agents with higher Pi, as they include more agents
from origin IU in their reference group. Finally, observe that when Pi = 0 results are
consistent with the self-fullling beliefs of Piketty's model.
On the other hand, due to the initial condition and the past trajectories of the previous
generation of agents from origin IL, the long-term social belief could be eb2∞. Now, ex-
pected eort for agents from origin IL is relatively low and reference group income will be
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low if P is low. Relative deprivation leads to lower long-term eort level than in the previ-
ous case, and its level will be more similar to the eort of agents from origin IU . Observe
that now there are two possible dynamics. On one hand, when µ0 < µ2∞, expected eort
will increase, and so will individual eort in the future. However, those optimist beliefs
have a threshold and steady-state eort beliefs will be relatively low. On the other hand,
when µ0 > µ2∞, agents will be attracted with probability 1 − Pr(µ, µ2∞) by µ2∞(and
eb2∞). Since agents believe that their peers (all agents are IL) in the reference group will
decrease their eort, their reference income will be lower (relative income eect is lower)
and they will choose a lower eort level. This situation determines self-fullling beliefs
due to eort beliefs.
When the learning function leads to social belief eb2∞, the reference group eect reduces
income mobility. Furthermore, if as in section 4.3 we assume thatσ is the true state of
the world, the lower eort level for agents from origin IL would be suboptimal in the
long term. Although "relative eort pays" and promotes high income mobility, agents
from origin IL are ineciently discouraged from trying to move up, due to social beliefs,
mobility trajectories, and inequality.
Equilibrium with intergenerational learning and no self-encouraged
agents
Conditions III, IV, VI, and VII, assume that relative eort is a cost, which establishes an
ambiguous relationship between eort and reference group income. We cannot really say
in general whether reference groups reduce or amplify inequality persistence of economic
success between agents from dierent social origins. However, the model allows us to
discuss some interesting issues. The intuition is that relative deprivation encourages
agents up to a certain point, but beyond that, relative deprivation discourages them
(Positional discouraged agent). To be more concrete, let us assume that there is a yRG∗
such that conditions III and VI hold if yRG < yRG∗, while conditions IV and VII hold if
yRG ≥ yRG∗ (Positional stimulated agent).
Case 1. If Pi = 1, expected peer eort does not matter. Reference group leads to higher
eort only if E(yi | IU) < yRG∗. Conversely, if E(yi | IU) ≥ yRG∗ ex-ante inequality leads
to a low eort trap.




which determines critically the long-term eort equilibrium for agents from IL. By fol-
lowing an reasoning analogous to the previous section's, we arrive to a long-term eort
level eb∞. Under these assumptions, higher expected eort of agents from origin IL and Pi
leads to higher steady-state eort, eL∞(Pi), only if ebL∞ < e
b∗
∞(Pi). Thus, the conclusions
obtained in the previous section remain unchanged. However, if (ebL∞) > e
b∗
∞(Pi) a higher
expected eort of agents from origin IL and Pi discourages their long-term eort, whose
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level will be lower than the equilibrium eort level presented in section 4.3. Observe that
under these assumptions the composition of reference groups is even more important for
social mobility.
Let us focus now on the role of ex-ante inequality between social origins, which was mea-
sured by ∆π. In both Case 1 and 2, there is a non-linear (inverted-U shaped) relationship
between ex ante inequality and long-term eort level of agents from origin IL. Also, when
Pi 6= 0 and a given level yRG∗, there is a trade-o between eb∞(Pi) and ∆π. When ∆π is
low, a positive relationship between expected peer eort eb∗∞(Pi) and eort eL∞ is quite
feasible. Higher peer eort encourages agents from low social origin, because they perceive
that expected relative rewards are high compared to the relative costs of eort. However,
when ∆π is high, eb∗∞(Pi) will be low. As a result, though expected peer eort will be
high, due to ex-ante inequality, agents from social origin IL reduce their eort level in
order to avoid frustration. Now, ex-ante inequality and high expected peer eort lead to
lower long-term eort equilibrium, as compared with section 4.3.
4.4 Reference groups and aspiration failure
In this section we use our model to explain aspiration failure proposed by Ray (2006).
Genicot and Ray (2017) argue that the formation of aspirations is one of the most relevant
factors in explaining upward mobility. They dene aspiration as a realistic and attain-
able target, which, ex-ante, is beyond an agent's possibilities, but which are potentially
achievable. They emphasize the role of social interactions and assume that aspirations are
based on the current and past achievements of an agent's socioeconomic neighborhood,
which is located within some exogenously given social window (aspiration window), de-
ned as ψ(yi, D(yi)). As a result, an agent's aspirations are determined by her income
and the distribution of wealth (D(yi)) in her cognitive window, which could include her
peers or individuals far richer than her. As a result aspiration formation is dened as
a : a(ψ(yi, D(yi))). Then, they assume that an agent's objective function considers the
aspiration gap (ag = y − a), namely the income dierence between her income and her
economic aspiration.
U(yi, agi) = U(yi, G(yi − a(ψ(yi, D(yi)) (33)
Based on these ideas, Ray (2006) identies two types of aspiration failure. Aspiration
failure type I occurs when agents from low social origin do not include agents from high
social origin in their aspiration window. As a result, the aspirations gap is low, as will be
individual investments for the future. In aspiration failure type II, agents from low social
origin include individuals from richer origins in their aspiration window, but the previous
inequality and the relative costs of eort are so high that agents perceive the goal to
33
be unattainable and they are discouraged. As a result they reduce their aspirations and
investment level in order to avoid frustration.
If we dene the income aspiration as the income reference group (a = yRG), we can discuss
the conditions that lead to these types of aspiration failure. Observe that P represents
the bandwidth of the aspiration window and it provides heterogeneity in reference group
income. Second, because our model assumes agents from two social origins, it is useful
to analyze how aspirations are socially determined. Furthermore, Ray (2006) argues that
an aspiration window depends on how much perceived mobility there is in society, the
higher the extent of mobility, the broader the aspirations window. The intergenerational
learning proposed in section 4.3 seems adequate to deal with this issue.
Previous papers focus on the eect of aspirations on income growth, wealth distribution,
preferences for redistribution, or income mobility (Stark, 2006; Bogliacino and Ortoleva,
2011; Genicot and Ray, 2017; Besley, 2017). Our model has more micro focus than these
papers. Dalton et al., (2016)'s model has a micro perspective and focuses on constraints
internal to individuals which leads to behavioral poverty traps. Our paper focuses on
social constraints and how they lead to low mobility traps.
On the one hand, when individuals are self-motivated, a very low P represents a restricted
aspiration window, which leads to aspirations failure type I. In this case, the expected
aspiration gap is low, and agents from origin IL are not encouraged to increase their
eort. This will especially be the case if there is economic polarization or other forms of
stratication.
On the other hand, there is aspiration failure type II when individuals from IL include
individuals IU in their aspiration window (high P ). Failure type II seems less consistent
with self-motivated individuals, although when P 6= 1, a low eb2∞ would reduce the eort
of agents from origin IL. When eort beliefs of agents from origin IL are low, expected
relative deprivation will be lower, which induces reducing eort. Although "relative
eort pays", agents from origin IL reduce their eort because they believe that their
peers in the reference group will decrease their eort. Therefore, expected mobility is low
(peer eort does not pay), and the aspiration gap leads to a lower long-term eort level
compared to those agents with P = 1 or a situation with ebL∞ = e. This eect will be
higher if P is low, which is related to failure type I.
When individuals are not self-motivated, reference groups may directly explain failure
type II. First, strong ex-ante inequality between agents from dierent social origins would
lead to lower eort. In this case the relatively poor individuals do aspire to be like the
rich, but the income gap is simply too large (see section 4.3). The cost of eort (or
investment) is too high, and the reward (in terms of a relative narrowing of the aspiration
gap) too low. The reference group leads to aspirations, but the feeling is widespread that
such aspirations are largely unreachable. Second, when leisure and relative income are not
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complements, an agent from social origin IL is more easily satised with her performance
and less motivated to achieve high income positions than agents with a less demanding
reference group or upper-class origin. As a result, higher reference group income leads
to lower eort because agents perceive the goal to be unattainable. Therefore, high
relative deprivation reduces the agent's income aspirations and eort level in order to
avoid frustration.
5 Conclusion
Our model shows how sociocultural inequalities, in general, and reference groups, in par-
ticular, shape inequality persistence. Expected relative deprivation with respect to a
reference group determines optimal eort decisions, which is a key determinant of inter-
generational income mobility. We identify the conditions under which reference groups
leads to high and low income mobility. We show that the size and direction of these eects
depend on, (a) the direction of income comparisons (i.e. to whom individuals compare,
(P ); (b) their intensity (i.e. how much do they compare, α and G(.)); (c) ex-ante in-
equality between agents from dierent social origins, ∆π, and relative eort rewards; and
(d) the information about their peers and past income mobility.
When the reference group of low-class origin individuals consists only of low-class origin
individuals, and their peers' expected eort is low, their reference income is closely aligned
to their expected income. Therefore, they have little incentive to increase their eort,
relative deprivation will be low, as will their investments for the future. This leads to a
self-fullling belief. However, the eect of a low-class reference group composition could
be compensated if their peers' expected eort were high.
When agents from low-class origin include individuals from high-social origin in their ref-
erence group, their expected income gap is larger. In this case, the impact of relative
deprivation on optimal eort is ambiguous, and assumptions about the functional form of
relative concerns are key. When relative concern is additive in the utility function, stan-
dard assumptions or prospect theory lead to situations where individual's eort response
(and income mobility) are very dierent. The former lead to self-encouraged agents,
while the latter describes discouraged agents. When we assume additivity in the utility
function away, the incidence of reference groups depends on the sign of two functions,
Ge, which describes how eort aects relative deprivation assessment, and GeyR , which
denes whether leisure and relative income are complements or substitutes. If relative
income and leisure are complements, the reference group always promotes higher eort
levels. Individuals from lower-class backgrounds are self-motivated by a larger income
gap and work harder in the pursuit of personal economic success and social ascent. In
this case, reference group income promotes high income mobility, a result that is in stark
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contrast to predictions from other models of inequality based upon self-fullling beliefs
and fatalistic predictions.
However, if relative income and eort are substitutes, relative deprivation has an ambigu-
ous eect on eort. In this case, the expected income gap between the individual and her
reference group may encourage or discourage lower-class agents. Ex-ante inequality and
expected relative deprivation are key determinants in explaining that ambiguity. There is
an inverted U-shape relationship between long term eort, and P , on the one hand, and
ex-ante inequality, on the other hand. If the income gap is due to the expected eort of
their peers, high reference income may increase eort and mobility. However, high ex-ante
inequality and low relative eort rewards could reduce the eort of low social origin indi-
viduals. This situation, which reduces income mobility, is related with aspiration failure
type II (Ray, 2006).
As expected reference group income is contextual, its eects depend on how much mobility
is perceived. In considering this issue we assume imperfect information and we model
beliefs using a Bayesian learning process. There are two stable solutions for eort beliefs
that depend on whether individuals from low-class origins choose high or low eort. In
the latter case, because individuals from low-class origins believe that their peers in the
reference group will reduce their eort, their reference income will be lower and they will
choose a lower eort level. This situation determines a self-fullling belief due to eort
beliefs.
Consistent with previous papers, the reference group eect leads to a suboptimal situa-
tion. When we assume forward-looking individuals, this ineciency is explained by the
between and within social origin eects, and it is higher the higher ex-ante inequality,
∆π. If we assume backward-looking individuals, results are ambiguous. In this case, even
if we assume that relative eort pays and promotes high income mobility, agents from
low-class origins would be ineciently discouraged from trying to move up, due to social
beliefs, mobility trajectories, and inequality. As a result their economic aspirations would
be ineciently lower.
Overall, our model and hence our conclusions are more general than previous models
of inequality based on self-fullling beliefs and fatalistic predictions. Unlike previous
models, we study how the functional form of relative concern, the composition of the
reference group, and the way beliefs are formed shape mobility patterns. Importantly, we
characterize the conditions under which reference groups may enhance intergenerational
mobility, thus extending previous analyses, such as Piketty (1998). Our model also spells
out what conditions may originate Ray's (2006) two aspiration failures.
Our model also provides new arguments to the insights that derive from the behavioural
approach. For instance, Haushofer and Fehr (2014) and Congdon et al. (2011) suggest that
extreme poverty may have psychological consequences, which aect economic behavior
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and could lead to people being discouraged from making the best mobility-enhancing
investments available, contributing to poverty persistence. Our theoretical contribution
helps to better understand these issues, by discussing how reference groups and unequal
initial conditions may discourage or encourage mobility-enhancing decisions.
Our results provide insights about what policies may enhance mobility. We show that
the reference group eect could increase intergenerational mobility in more integrated
societies, where economic diversity in the reference groups were large enough and income
inequality were relatively low. Thus, policies that increase the economic diversity of refer-
ence groups and that seek to reduce segregation may enhance intergenerational mobility.
These include armative action, public education, convening young people and enrolling
them in programs (e.g. school or kindergarten) away from their communities. The rst
two policies have also been advocated by Ray (2006) to increase low mobility, when this
is due to the presence of low economic aspirations in an unequal society, as they help
create local, attainable incentives at the lower end of the income distribution, while the
latter two have been advocated by Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) to ght the eects
from acting White. Redistributive policies may also have an impact on mobility if they
alter the reference income. Conditional cash transfer programmes, for instance, primar-
ily aimed at reducing poverty, could modify the composition of reference groups, change
eort decisions, and thus aect long-term income mobility.
The results of this paper suggest a number of new avenues for empirical research. On
the one hand, they provide a theoretical framework to evaluate the reaction of agents
empirically, in terms of eort, when their relative situation and rewards change. On the
other hand, they describe how relative concern could aect income mobility through the
formation of aspirations. One problem of empirical studies on this issue is that they
fail to explain the implications of self-selection into reference groups. In our model,
we avoid discussing this issue and consider the parameters that dene reference group
integration to be a random variable. Our model demonstrates that reference groups aect
income mobility even in this hypothetical situation. However, a model which focuses on
endogenizing reference group choice is a possible direction for future research. A number
of important issues remain to be addressed. First, our approach assumes only two social
origins, but this model can be extended to a model in which society has multiple-social
origins. Second, in our model the possibility of strategic behavior on the part of agents
from dierent social origins or reference groups is ignored. Third, this paper proposes a
bayesian updating belief process, but dierent learning processes could also be considered.
Finally, in this paper we consider only one perspective of status, the comparison role of
the reference group, but there are other perspectives of relative or positional concern.
37
References
[1] Adams, J.S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange, in L. Berkowitz (eds.), Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2, 267299. New York, Academic Press.
[2] Aghion, P., P. Bolton , C. Harris and P. Julien (1991). Optimal learning by experi-
mentation, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 62154.
[3] Akerlof. G.A. and R.E. Kranton (2005). Identity and the Economics of Organiza-
tions, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 932.
[4] Alesina, A. and G.M. Angeletos (2005). Fairness and redistribution, American Eco-
nomic Review, 95(4), 961980.
[5] Alesina, A. and P. Guliano (2011). Preferences for redistribution, in A. Bisin and
J. Benhabib, (eds.) Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1A, 93132. Amsterdam,
North-Holland.
[6] Antman, F. and D. McKenzie (2007). Poverty traps and nonlinear income dynam-
ics with measurement error and individual heterogeneity, Journal of Development
Studies, 43(6), 10571083.
[7] Appadurai, A. (2004). The capacity to aspire, in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds.),
Culture and Public Action. Stanford University Press.
[8] Austen-Smith, D. and R. Fryer (2005). An economic analysis of acting
white,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), 551583.
[9] Behrman, J. and P. Taubman (1990). The intergenerational correlation between
children's adult earnings and their parents' income. Result from the Michigan Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics, Review of Income and Wealth, 36(2), 115127.
[10] Besley T (2017). Aspirations and the political economy of inequality, Oxfortd Eco-
nomic Papers, 69 (1), 135.
[11] Björklund, A. and M. Jantti (1997). Intergenerational income mobility in Sweden
compared to the United States, American Economic Review, 87(5), 10091018.
[12] Bilancini, E. and L. Boncinelli (2008). Ordinal vs. cardinal status: Two examples,
Economics Letters, 101, 1719.
[13] Breen R. and C. Garcia-Peñalosa (2002). Bayesian learning and gender segregation,
Journal of Labor Economics, 20(4), 899922.
[14] Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels (2000). ERC, a Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and
Competition, American Economic Review, 90(1), 166193.
38
[15] Boudon, R. (1974). Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality. New York, Wiley.
[16] Bourdieu, P. and J.C. Passeron (1964). Les Héritiers. Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit.
[17] Bourdieu, P. and J.C. Passeron (1970). La Reproduction. Paris, Les Éditions de Mi-
nuit.
[18] Bowles, S. (2004). Microeconomics, Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton,
Princeton University Press.
[19] Bowles S. and Y. Park (2005). Emulation, inequality, and work hours: Was Thorsten
Veblen right?, Economic Journal, 115(507), 397412.
[20] Card, D., A. Mas, E. Moretti and E. Saez (2012). Inequality at work: The eect of
peer salaries on job satisfaction, American Economic Review, 102(6), 29813003.
[21] Carter, M. and C. Barrett (2006). The economics of poverty traps and persistent
poverty, an asset-based approach, Journal of Development Studies, 42(2), 178199.
[22] Chetty, R., N. Hendren, P. Kline and E. Saez (2014). Where is the land of opportu-
nity? The geography of intergenerational mobility in the United States, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 129(4), 15531623.
[23] Clark, A. (2009).Adaptation, poverty and well-being, Some issues and observations
with special reference to the capability approach and development studies , Journal
of Human Development and Capabilities, 10(1), 2142
[24] Clark, A. and A. Oswald (1998). Comparison-concave utility and following behavior
in social and economic settings, Journal of Public Economics, 70, 133155.
[25] Clark, A., N. Kristensen and N. Westergård-Nielsen (2009a).  Economic satisfac-
tion and income rank in small neighbourhoods, Journal of the European Economic
Association, 7(23), 519527.
[26] Clark, A., N. Kristensen and N. Westergård-Nielsen (2009b). Job satisfaction and
co-worker wages, status or signal?, Economic Journal, 119(536), 430447.
[27] Clark, A. and C. Senik (2010). Who compares to whom? The anatomy of income
comparisons in Europe ,Economic Journal, 120(544), 57394.
[28] Clark A., and C. D'Ambrosio (2014). "Attitudes to income inequality: Experimental
and survey evidence", in A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.). Handbook of
Income Distribution, Vol 2A. Amsterdam, North-Holland.
39
[29] Congdon, W., Kling, J. and S. Mullainathan (2011). Policy and Choice. Public Fi-
nance through the Lens of Behavioral Economics. Washington, D.C, The Brooking
Institution Press.
[30] Corak, M. (2013). "Inequality from generation to generation: The United States in
comparison" in: R. Rycroft (ed.) The Economics of Inequality, Poverty, and Dis-
crimination in the 21st Century. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
[31] Dalton, P.S., S. Ghosal and A. Mani (2016). "Poverty and aspirations failure", Eco-
nomic Journal, 126(590), 165188.
[32] Duesenberry, J.S. (1949). Income, Savings and the Theory of Consumer Behavior.
Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
[33] Durante, R., L. Putterman and J. van der Weele (2014). Preferences for redistri-
bution and perception of fairness: An experimental study, Journal of the European
Economic Association, 12(4), 10591086.
[34] Elster, J. (1985). Sour Grapes, Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
[35] Falk A. and M. Knell (2004). Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous goals and reference
standards, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106 (3), 41743.
[36] Fehr E. and K. Schmidt (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817868.
[37] Fehr, E. and K. Ho (2011). Tastes, castes and culture: The inuence of society on
preferences, The Economic Journal, 121(556), 396412.
[38] Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. (2005). Income and well-being: An empirical analysis of the
comparison income eect, Journal of Public Economics, 89(56), 9971019.
[39] Festinger, L. (1954). Teoría de la Disonancia Cognitiva. Madrid, Instituto de Estudios
Políticos.
[40] Frank, R. (1997). The frame of reference as a public good, The Economic Journal,
107(445), 18321847.
[41] Frank, R. (2005). Positional externalities cause large and preventable welfare loses,
American Economic Review, 95(2), 137141.
[42] Genicot G. and D. Ray (2014).Aspiration and inequality, Econometrica, 85,
489519.
40
[43] Haushofer, J. and E. Fehr (2014). On the psychology of poverty. Science, 344(6186),
862867.
[44] Heetz, O. and R. Frank (2011). Preferences for status: Evidence and economic
implications, in J. Benhabib, M.O. Jackson and A. Bisin (eds.), Handbook of Social
Economics, Vol. 1A, 6991. Amsterdam, North-Holland.
[45] Henrich, J., St.J. Heine, and A. Norenzayan (2010). The weirdest people in the
world, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61135.
[46] Hopkins, E. (2008). Inequality, happiness and relative concerns, What actually is
their relationship?, Journal of Economic Inequality, 6(4), 351372.
[47] Huet-Vaughn, E. (2015). Do social comparisons motivate workers? A eld experi-
ment on relative earnings, labor supply and the inhibitory eect of pay inequality.
Working Paper, UC Berkeley .
[48] Jäntti M. and S. Jenkins (2014). Income mobility, in A.B. Atkinson and F.
Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol 2A. Amsterdam, North-
Holland.
[49] Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect theory, an analysis of decision under
risk, Econometrica, 47, 263291.
[50] Kandel E. and E. Lazear (1992). Peer pressure and parnerships, Journal of Political
Economic, 100 (4), 801817.
[51] Kolm, S-C (1976a). Unequal Inequalities. I, Journal of Economic Theory, 12,
416442.
[52] Kolm, S-C (1976b). Unequal Inequalities. II, Journal of Economic Theory, 13,
82111.
[53] Krueger, A. (2012). The rise and consequences of inequality in
the United States. Speech at the Center for American Progress.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/les/krueger cap speech
nal remarks.pdf
[54] Kuziemko, I., R. W. Buell, T. Reich, and M. I. Norton (2014). "Last-place aver-
sion". Evidence and redistributive implications, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
129, 105149.
[55] Layard, R. (1980). Human satisfactions and public policy, Economic Journal, 90,
737750.
41
[56] Lewis, G.W. and D.T. Ulph (1998). Poverty, inequality and welfare, Economic
Journal, 98, 117131.
[57] Mitnik, P., V. Bryant , D. B. Grusky and M. Weber (2015). New estimates of
intergnerational income mobility using administrative data. Statistics of Income,
Internal Revenue Service. Mimeo .
[58] Mookherjee D., S. Napel, and D. Ray (2010). Aspirations, segregation and occupa-
tional choice,Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, 139168.
[59] Piketty, T. (1995). Social mobility and redistributive politics, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 110(3), 551584.
[60] Piketty, T. (1998). Self-fullling beliefs about social status Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 70(1), 115132.
[61] Piketty, T. (2000). Theories of persistent inequality and intergenerational mobility
in A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol.
1, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
[62] Postlewaite A. (1998). Social status, norms and economic performances. The social
basis of interdependent preferences, European Economic Review, 42, 779800.
[63] Rabin, M (2002). A perspective on psychology and economics, European Economic
Review, 46, 657685.
[64] Ray, D. (2006). Aspirations, poverty and economic change, in A. V. Banerjee, R.
Benabou, and D. Mookherjee (eds.), Understanding poverty. Oxford, Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
[65] Robson, A (1992).Status, the distribution of wealth, private and social attitudes to
risk, Econometrica, 60(4), 837857.
[66] Sen, A. (1985a). Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam, North-Holland.
[67] Sen, A. (1985b). The Standard of Living. The Tanner Lectures. Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
[68] Smith, L. and P. Sørensen (2000). Pathological outcomes of observational learning,
Econometrica, 68(2), 37198.
[69] Solon, G. (2002). Cross-country dierences in intergenerational earnings mobility,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 5966.
[70] Stark, O., W. Hyll and Y. Wang (2012). Endogenous selection of comparison groups,
human capital formation, and tax policy, Economica, 79(713), 6272.
42
[71] Stutzer, A. (2004). "The role of income aspirations in individual happiness", Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54(1), 89109.
[72] Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice, a reference-
dependent model, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 10391061.
[73] Vendrik M. and G. Woltjer (2007). Happiness and loss aversión: Is utility concave
or convex in relative income?,Journal of Public Economics, 91(7-8), 14231448.
[74] Weber, M. (1922). Economy and Society. Translated and reprinted, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1978.
[75] Zimmerman, David (1992). Regression toward mediocrity in economic stature,
American Economic Review, 82, 409429.
43
Appendix A The role of eort rewards and ex-ante in-
equality on relative deprivation and atti-
tude
Discussion
If we assume that relative eort represents a cost (Ge(·) < 0), which is the best case study,
we are able to examine how the magnitude of eort rewards stimulates (or discourages)
agents. Observe that condition VII denes the locus where individuals face relative depri-
vation, but they do not respond to a change in reference group income (∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG = 0).34
The locus which denes indierent agents allows us to identify the alternative values of
θ and 4π, that depends essentially on the sign of GyRyRyR(·)
Proposition 4. When E(yR) < 0, under non additive comparisons, GeyR
constant and asymmetry in the income comparison:
If GyRyRyR(·) > 0 (Principle of diminishing transfers in gaps), there is no
monotonic relationship between the sign of ∂e∗∗Leq/∂yRG and θ and it is ambiguous
how individuals respond to higher θ (how agents respond to an increase in θ
depends on GyRyRyR(·) and GyRyR(·)).
If GyRyRyR(·) ≤ 0, regardless of the functional form of GyRyR(·) and GyRyRyR(·),
and 4π there is a unique value of θ, θ̃, such that ∂e∗∗Leq/∂yRG < 0 if θ < θ̃ and
∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG > 0 if θ > θ̃.
Under the principle of diminishing transfers assumption, an increase in θ has a direct
positive eect on eort, because it improves expected relative deprivation, but a higher
relative income decreases the sensibility of the marginal utility of relative deprivation
(↓ GyRyR(·) because GyRyRyR(·) > 0), which reduces the incentive to increase eort. Given
these eects in opposite directions, it is ambiguous how individuals respond to higher θ.
However, this ambiguity disappears when GyRyRyR(·) ≤ 0. In this case, an increase in θ
increases expected relative deprivation and the sensibility of marginal utility of relative
deprivation. Both eects play in the same direction, and eort will increase.
In the latter case, it is useful to examine the relationship between θ and ∆π (eort rewards
and ex-ante inequality rewards) when ∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG = 0. There is a function f(G(.), θ, eLeq,4π) :
f̃(θ,4π), which denes the set of all values of θ and 4π where individuals do not respond
to changes in reference group incomes. Given previous assumptions, we can conclude that
f̃θ(θ,4π)
˜f4π(θ,4π)
> 0. In this case, higher θ generates incentives to increase eort, which can be
compensated with a higher 4π. To make this result a little more concrete, assume two
34To simplify, we assume that GeyR is constant and e
b
Ueq ≤ (1− α)cθβM∆y < ebLeq.
44
economies A and B, with f̃A(θA,4πA) = f̃B(θB,4πB), but the former presents higher
ex-ante inequality (4πA > 4πB). In order for there to be a stimulated income gap eect
on eort decisions, economy A will require higher eort reward levels θ such θ >θA > θB
Namely, there is less stimulation in more unequal economies. The proof of these results
is presented in the next section, where we also demonstrate that the sign of f̃θ(θ,4π)˜f4π(θ,4π) is
indeterminate when GyRyRyR(.) < 0.
Proofs
To analyze the role of eort rewards and ex-ante inequality on attitudes toward eort we
incorporate two simplifying assumptions, GeyR is constant and ebUeq < e
b
Leq.




= dθGyRyR(·) + θGyRyRyR(·)∂yR/∂θ = 0 (34)
Observe that GyRyR(·) < 0 and ∂yR/∂θ > 0 (because ebUeq < ebLeq). The locus which denes
indierent agents depends essentially on the sign and magnitude of GyRyRyR(·).
When GyRyRyR(·) > 0 (Principle of diminishing transfers), there is a function f(G(·),
θ, eLeq,4π) : θ̃(θ) = dθGyRyRyR(·) = −θGyRyR(·)∂yR/∂θ, which denes the condition that
must be met for ∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG = 0 for alternatives values of parameter θ. Therefore, given
G(·) and 4π, ∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG < 0 if θLow < θ̃(θ) and ∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG > 0 if θhigh > θ̃(θ). Observe
that there is no monotonous relationship between the sign of ∂e∗∗Ueq/∂yRG and θ. How agents
respond to an increase in θ depends on GyRyRyR(·) and GyRyR(·).
When GyRyRyR(·) ≥ 0, the function is undened for a range of values of θ and ∂yR/∂θ = 0
holds only for unique value of θ.
We focus now in the relationship between θ and 4π when ∂yR/∂θ = 0. There is a function
f(G(·), θ, eLeq,4π) : f̃(θ,4π), which denes the set of all values of θ and 4π where
individuals do not respond to changes in reference group incomes. The total derivative of
the function I(·) with respect θ and 4π, allows us to analyze the sign of the derivatives
of f̃(θ,4π).

























Figure A. 1: The role of eort rewards on relative deprivation and attitude
toward eort
1.a)GyRyRyR(·) > 0 1.b)GyRyRyR(·) ≤ 0
anexonal.png
When GyRyRyR(·) < 0, both numerator and denominator are positive and ∂θ/∂4π > 0
and f̃θ(θ,4π)˜f4π(θ,4π) > 0 (observe that
∂yR/∂4π < 0). Namely, to ensure that the condition
θβM∆yGyRyR(·) + GyRe(·) = 0 is met, when θ increases, it is necessary a higher relative
deprivation (higher ∆π ) to increases the sensibility of the marginal utility of relative de-
privation GyRyR(·), and then the marginal utility GyR(·). The signs of ∂θ/∂4π and θ̃(θ,4π)˜f4π(θ,4π)
are undetermined when GyRyRyR(·) ≥ 0. The increase of θ improves relative deprivation
(∂yR/∂θ > 0), which reduces the marginal utility of relative deprivation (GyRyR(·) < 0),
but at a increasing rate (GyRyRyR(·) ≥ 0). Given these eects in opposite directions, it is
unclear which is the relationship between θ and ∆π.
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Figure A. 2: The role of eort rewards and ex-ante inequality on relative depri-
vation and attitude toward eort (GyRyRyR(·) < 0)
 
Appendix B The intergenerational learning in detail
Assume that for each agent from origin IL there is a latent variable which describes
the relation between economic success and eort, which is dened in equation (1) as
Y ′it = π + θβeit. An agent i from generation t does not observe ejt of agent j, but he
knows the individual social mobility trajectories (y1 or y0) of all agents from generation
t − 1th(IA.vii). For this reason, the mobility outcome of agents IL from generation t
represents a signal about the eort of agents from origin IL, which contributes to shape
the beliefs of generation (t+ 1).
It is useful to consider that the economic performance is stochastically related to eort,
incorporating a random variable vit, which represents the luck of the generation t. There-
fore, the expected probability that n agents from origin IL from generation t reach y1 is
dened as,
E(Pr(y1t = y1, y2t = y1, .....ynt = y1 | i = 1...n ∈ IL)) =
∏
∀i∈I
(π + θβMeit + vit) (35)
where vit represents an idiosyncratic shock (which reects income realization) for each
generation t and agent i , with E(vit) = 0 and 0 ≤ π + θβeit + vit ≤ 1, for 0 ≤ eit ≤ E.
Observe that once agents i and j from origin IL choose eit and ejt respectively, Pr(yit =
y1 | i ∈ IL) and Pr(yjt = y1 | i ∈ IL) are two statistically independent events.
47
Taking xt as the real share of successful agents from origin IL from generation t, agents





t | ν ′t) = Ω(ε′t, ν ′t | ν ′t) = Φ(eMt(ε′t), ν ′t | ν ′t) (36)
where εt and νt are vectors of n dimensions, which respectively reect individual eorts
in t (e1t, e2t.., ent) and n random variables (v1t, v2t.., vnt), and ε′t and ν
′
t are particular
realizations of both vectors. For notational simplicity, we introduce the function Φ(·),
whose argument is the mean eort of agents from origin IL in t (eMt), which is a linear
function of each element in the vector εt. As agents know π, θ, βM , and ∆y, given eMt they
know the distribution of signals (IA.i, IA.ii,IA.iv, IA.vi, IA.vii, IA.viii), which describes
the expected share of successful agents from origin IL from generation t, conditional on
the state v′t.
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